グローバルサウスのエネルギー転換の政治経済学：国内連合、国家能力、気候金融の構造的制約
The Political Economy of Energy Transitions in the Global South: Domestic Coalitions, State Capacity, and the Structural Constraints of Climate Finance 2. Authors (原題)
Ezekiel Kelly
🤖 gxceed AI 要約
日本語
南アフリカ・インド・リチウム三角地帯の比較から、エネルギー転換の進展が国内政治連合と国際金融システム内の国家の位置に左右されると論じる。JETPの拠出額は13.92億ドルだが、実際に配分されたのは主権政策融資のみで、国営電力向け優遇融資は借入制約で滞留。インドでは国営企業が化石燃料に2.33兆ルピー、クリーンエネルギーに0.30兆ルピーを投資し、42GWの再エネ入札が買い手不在となった。気候金融の「額」より「構成と経路」が国内転換政治を規定することを示す。
English
Comparing South Africa, India and the lithium triangle, the paper argues transition outcomes hinge on domestic political settlements and the state's position in the international financial hierarchy. Only 42% of USD 13.92bn in JETP pledges was allocated by Dec 2025, with sovereign policy loans fully disbursed but concessional loans to the state utility blocked by borrowing limits. In India, nine state-owned firms invested INR 2.33tn in fossil fuels versus INR 0.30tn in clean energy, while 42GW of tendered renewables lacked buyers. The composition and channel of climate finance, not headline volume, shape transition politics.
Unofficial AI-generated summary based on the public title and abstract. Not an official translation.
📝 gxceed 編集解説 — Why this matters
日本のGX文脈において
日本企業・政策担当者にとっては、JETPやアジアの石炭移行金融を設計する際の教訓を提供する。国営企業の借入制約や調達入札の買い手不足は、日本のトランジション・ファイナンスやアジア各国での案件形成にも示唆を与える。SSBJ開示とは直接の接点は薄いが、移行計画の実効性評価に資する。
In the global GX context
For global disclosure scholarship, this paper highlights that transition finance effectiveness depends on domestic political settlements and fiscal constraints, not just pledge volumes. It complements TCFD/ISSB transition-plan discussions by showing why capital allocation diverges from disclosure commitments in emerging markets, and informs JETP and blended-finance design under the Glasgow Financial Alliance framework.
👥 読者別の含意
🔬研究者:気候金融の実効性を政治経済・国家能力の観点から分析する枠組みを提供する。
🏢実務担当者:新興国での再エネ調達・移行金融案件のリスク評価に、国営企業の借入制約や買い手リスクを組み込む必要性を示す。
🏛政策担当者:JETP等の気候金融設計では、拠出額より融資チャネルと国内財政スペースへの配慮が重要である。
📄 Abstract（原文）
Why do energy transitions in the Global South advance unevenly when renewable technologies are cost-competitive and international climate finance is on offer? I argue that outcomes depend on the interaction of two variables: the political settlement that determines whether incumbent fossil fuel interests are compensated, bypassed or displaced, and the position of the state within a hierarchical international financial system, which conditions whether external finance widens or narrows fiscal space. Using a structured, focused comparison of South Africa, India and the lithium-producing states of Chile, Argentina and Bolivia, based on official programme, audit, statistical and regulatory records, I identify three mechanisms. In South Africa, 42 per cent of USD 13.92 billion in Just Energy Transition Partnership pledges had been allocated by December 2025; sovereign policy loans were the only instrument allocated in full, while concessional loans intended for the state utility were held back by its borrowing restrictions. In India, nine state-owned energy firms invested INR 2.33 trillion in fossil fuels and INR 0.30 trillion in clean energy in fiscal year 2025, and state distribution companies returned to long-term coal contracts while about 42 GW of tendered renewable capacity lacked buyers. In the lithium triangle, the state's share of rents follows state capacity and business power, and remains exposed to a fall in the average price of battery-grade lithium carbonate from USD 63,700 per tonne in 2022 to USD 9,000 in 2025. The article shows how the composition and channel of climate finance, rather than its headline volume, shape domestic transition politics.
🔗 Provenance — このレコードを発見したソース
- openalex https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.23021256first seen 2026-09-30 04:54:20
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