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中国における財務専門性がAIナラティブを形成する時:CEOの財務バックグラウンドと象徴的AI開示

When financial expertise shapes AI narratives in China: CEO financial background and symbolic AI disclosure (原題)

Yufei Gan, Yimei Man

International Journal of Emerging Markets📚 査読済 / ジャーナル2026-11-03#AI×ESG対象セクター: cross_sector
DOI: 10.1108/ijoem-04-2026-0874
原典: https://doi.org/10.1108/ijoem-04-2026-0874
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🤖 gxceed AI 要約

日本語

中国A株上場企業2010〜2023年を対象に、CEOの財務バックグラウンドがAIオーバークレーム(AI開示と発明ベースのAI能力の乖離)に与える影響を検証。財務出身CEOは短期金融資産配分を増やしR&D投資を減らすことで乖離を広げる。外部検証が弱く、市場圧力や政策主導のAIナラティブが強いほど効果が顕著となる。

English

Using Chinese A-share firms (2010-2023), this study shows CEOs with financial backgrounds are more likely to overclaim AI, measured as the gap between AI disclosure and invention-based AI capability. The effect runs through higher short-term financial asset allocation and lower R&D, and intensifies when external verification is weak and policy-driven AI narratives are salient.

Unofficial AI-generated summary based on the public title and abstract. Not an official translation.

📝 gxceed 編集解説 — Why this matters

日本のGX文脈において

AI活用やDXの対外発信が拡大する日本企業にとっても、開示と実態の乖離(シンボリック開示)は統合報告書・SSBJ開示の信頼性を左右する論点。CEO属性と開示ガバナンスの関係は、日本的な人材登用・取締役会監督の議論にも示唆を与える。

In the global GX context

Speaks to global disclosure scholarship on symbolic vs. substantive reporting and greenwashing-adjacent overclaiming, extending it to AI narratives. Relevant to ISSB/CSRD debates on how governance attributes and weak assurance enable decoupling between disclosure and capability.

👥 読者別の含意

🔬研究者:AI開示の実質性を測る『開示-能力ギャップ』指標と上層理論の拡張は、開示ガバナンス研究に有用な枠組みを提供する。

🏢実務担当者:AI・DXの対外発信が実態を超えないよう、経営層の属性と投資配分の整合を点検する材料になる。

🏛政策担当者:AI関連の政策ナラティブが過剰開示を誘発しうる点は、開示規制・第三者検証制度の設計に示唆を与える。

📄 Abstract(原文)

Purpose This study examines whether CEO financial background shapes corporate artificial intelligence (AI) overclaiming in an emerging-market context. Drawing on upper echelons theory (UET), we argue that financially experienced CEOs may frame AI as a market-oriented strategic narrative while underinvesting in the long-term technological capabilities needed to substantiate such claims. Design/methodology/approach Using Chinese A-share listed firms from 2010 to 2023, we measure AI overclaiming as the gap between AI disclosure and invention-based AI capability. We estimate models with firm and year fixed effects and validate the findings through robustness tests, including AI investment- and residual-based measures, as well as endogeneity, placebo and channel analyses. Findings CEO financial background is positively associated with corporate AI overclaiming. Channel analyses suggest that financially experienced CEOs widen the disclosure–capability gap by increasing short-term financial asset allocation and reducing R&D investment. This effect is stronger when external verification is weak, market pressure is high and policy-driven AI narratives are more salient. Originality/value This study identifies CEO financial background as a managerial antecedent of AI overclaiming. It extends UET by showing how financial career imprints shape emerging-technology narratives and resource allocation. It also advances AI overclaiming research in emerging markets by showing that weak verification, state-guided capital allocation and policy-driven AI narratives intensify symbolic–substantive decoupling.

🔗 Provenance — このレコードを発見したソース

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gxceed は公開メタデータに基づく研究支援データセットです。要約・翻訳・解説は AI 支援で生成されています。 最終的な解釈・検証は利用者が原典資料に基づいて行うことを前提とします。