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混合政策下における新エネルギー車サプライチェーンの協調的炭素削減に関する微分ゲーム研究

Research on the Differential Game of Collaborative Carbon Emission Reduction in the New Energy Vehicle Supply Chain Under a Mixed Policy (原題)

Yan Chen, Jiemei Pang, Yaqian Wu

Sustainability📚 査読済 / ジャーナル2026-11-13#EV・輸送Origin: CN経営インパクト: 調達リスク対象セクター: automotive
DOI: 10.3390/su182211609
原典: https://doi.org/10.3390/su182211609

🤖 gxceed AI 要約

日本語

NEVサプライチェーンの上流部品製造(電池等)の排出をクレジット取引政策が見落としている点を指摘し、「クレジット取引+炭素取引」の混合政策を微分ゲームで分析。混合政策はサプライヤーを削減システムに統合し、上流・下流双方の自発的削減努力と低炭素マーケティングを促すことを示す。集中意思決定が製品炭素削減水準と低炭素評判を高め、改良型双方費用分担契約がパレート改善を実現する。

English

This study models a two-echelon NEV supply chain under a mixed 'credit trading + carbon trading' policy using a differential game, comparing it with credit-only policy under decentralized and centralized decisions. The mixed policy better integrates suppliers into carbon reduction, boosts voluntary upstream/downstream efforts and low-carbon marketing, and centralized decisions raise product carbon reduction and reputation. An improved bilateral cost-sharing contract achieves Pareto improvement.

Unofficial AI-generated summary based on the public title and abstract. Not an official translation.

📝 gxceed 編集解説 — Why this matters

日本のGX文脈において

日本ではEV普及と電池サプライチェーンのScope 3排出管理が重要課題であり、上流を含む政策設計とサプライチェーン協調の知見は、SSBJ開示やカーボンプライシング議論に示唆を与える。

In the global GX context

Adds to global debate on how carbon pricing and credit-based EV mandates interact, and how Scope 3 upstream battery emissions can be internalized through supply-chain coordination contracts—relevant to CSRD Scope 3 and transition finance for EV supply chains.

👥 読者別の含意

🔬研究者:微分ゲームによるサプライチェーン協調と混合気候政策の理論分析の枠組みを提供する。

🏢実務担当者:上流サプライヤーを含む費用分担契約設計の参考になり、Scope 3削減の協調メカニズム構築に使える。

🏛政策担当者:クレジット取引のみでは上流排出を捉えられない点を示し、ハイブリッド脱炭素政策設計の根拠となる。

📄 Abstract(原文)

The transportation sector is a major carbon emitter, with new energy vehicle (NEV) promotion via the credit trading policy being a key mitigation strategy. However, the credit trading policy overlooks huge carbon emissions from upstream component manufacturing such as batteries. The “manufacturer–retailer” two-echelon supply chain (SC) analysis framework constructed by most current studies fails to capture the significant potential for carbon emission reduction (CER) in the upstream phase of the NEV SC. This study examines a mixed “credit trading + carbon trading” policy, which compensates for the credit-only perspective’s limitations, in a two-echelon NEV supply chain (a supplier and a manufacturer). Using a differential game approach, this study compares the standalone credit trading policy and the mixed policy, under decentralized and centralized decision-making, to assess effects on supply chain members’ CER efforts, low-carbon marketing efforts, product CER level, corporate’s low-carbon reputation, individual profits, and total SC profit, and to design an improved bilateral cost-sharing contract. Results show that the mixed policy better integrates suppliers into the CER system, incentivizes greater voluntary CERs from upstream and downstream members, and maintains positive low-carbon marketing efforts. Under the mixed policy, centralized decision-making outperforms decentralized decision-making in raising the product CER level and strengthening corporate’s low-carbon reputation. An improved bilateral cost-sharing contract ensures a fair allocation of decarbonization-related costs and benefits among supply chain members and achieves Pareto improvement for the SC. These findings provide valuable guidance for policymakers to design hybrid decarbonization policies and for NEV supply chain members to construct supply chain coordination mechanisms for collaborative CER.

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